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MUNICIPAL HOME RULE IN WISCONSIN
ROBERT W. HANSEN
T HE degree of local autonomy to be exercised by municipal corpo-
rations has for many years been a subject of discussion by legisla-
tors, jurists, academicians, writers, and citizens generally. It is a matter
concerning which there has always been considerable difference of
opinion. Self-government for local communities has been defended as
necessary to prevent cities from becoming ineffectual subdivisions of
state governments, mere satrapies of the central authority. On the
other hand, complete local autonomy has been attacked as creating a
multitude of city-states, each community an imperium in imperio. In
Wisconsin this matter of home rule has been a subject of debate and
controversy for more than a quarter century." Certain it is that in
this commonwealth the advocates of municipal home rule have waged
a long and weary struggle, marked by pyrrhic victories and Sisyphean
accomplishments. Their march through the desert to the Promised
Land has brought them to many mirages, but to few oases. The story
of the development of the Wisconsin law on the relationship between
state and local governments is an absorbing one.
Historically speaking, it is probably true that in Wisconsin and
elsewhere we have followed the New England township governments.
M. De Tocqueville, one of the keenest foreign observers of the Ameri-
can system of government, over one hundred years ago made the
observation that the New England towns were "small independent
republics over matters of local concern," remarking, "they are inde-
pendent in all that concerns themselves, and among the inhabitants of
New England I believe that no man is found who acknowledges that
the state has any right to interfere in their local interests." This
distinction between state and local autonomy "always obtained in Con-
tinental Europe, originating in the feudal system. * * * One of the
fundamental principles of that system was local autonomy. When
joined with the Roman idea of corporate capacity, it resulted in the
recognition of local government corporations having a sphere of local
autonomy apart from the state as a whole."
'2
Among early Wisconsin cases there is definite recognition of so-
called "inherent" powers of municipal corporations, those powers
which are necessary to the existence of the corporation and which
are not dependent upon state grant or charter. Certain early cases
requiring municipal assent to legislative ratification of a harbor con-
struction contract' and protecting the town's vested rights in private
I Van Gilder v. City of Madison, (Wis. 1936) 267 N.W. 25, 268 N.W. 108.
2 GOODNOW, MuNIcIPAL HOME RULE, 109-110.
3Hasbrouck v. City of Milwaukee, 13 Wis. 42 (1860).
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property,4 while probably based on constitutional restrictions, indicate
acceptance of the viewpoint that the municipality possessed inherent
rights. In the original charter granted the City of Milwaukee, the
legislature provided "that the city shall have the general powers pos-
sessed by municipal corporations at common law." What such inherent
powers and common law prerogatives included was never clearly
detailed," and is no longer of more than academic interest, for the
reason that the proposition that cities possess inherent powers was
first questioned and later repudiated by the Wisconsin Supreme
Court.8 Today, in this jurisdiction, municipalities have or can exercise
only such power as is conferred by express or implied power of law,0
including therewith powers incident to powers expressly granted and
those indispensable to the declared object and purposes of corpora-
tion?' The present day trend is definitely away from the earlier con-
cept of the municipal corporation possessing inherent powers?,
In their efforts to secure some general grant of power over local
affairs, municipal administrators relied upon the "general welfare
clause" in municipal charters.12 (This clause customarily granted
power and authority to manage finances and to enact ordinances for
the government and good order of the city, for the benefit of trade,
commerce, and health, for the suppression of vice, for the prevention
of crime, etc.) But the supreme court, in a case concerning the validity
of a City of Milwaukee ordinance forbidding operation of elevators
except by duly licensed operators, held that, where the general grant
was followed by specific grants of power, such specific grants acted
- Town of Milwaukee v. City of Milwaukee, 12 Wis. 93 (1860).
, Wis. Laws (1852) c. 56 § 1.
6"The general powers possessed by municipal corporations at common law are
words of very general import and an attempt to point out all the acts which
they might be held to authorize would be a work of considerable labor."
Miller v. City of Milwaukee, 14 Wis. 699 (1861). See also Butler v. City of
Milwaukee, 15 Wis. 546 (1862); Clason v. City of Milwaukee, 30 Wis. 316
(1872).
7 Jones v. Kolb, 56 Wis. 263, 14 N.W. 177 (1882).
8 " * * * all the powers of the corporation are derived from the law and its
charter." Ricketson v. Milwaukee, 105 Wis. 591, 81 N.W. 864 (1900).
9 Flannagan v. Buxton, 145 Wis. 81, 129 N.W. 642 (1911) ; City of Superior v.
Roemer, 154 Wis. 345, 141 N.W. 250 (1913) ; Wisconsin Assn. of Master
Bakers v. City of Milwaukee, 191 Wis. 302, 210 N.W. 707 (1926); Town of
Swiss v. United States Nat. Bank, 196 Wis. 171, 218 N.W. 842 (1928).
L0 State v. Kelly, 154 Wis. 482, 143 N.W. 153 (1913); City of Milwaukee v.
Raulf, 164 Wis. 172, 159 N.W. 819 (1916); State v. Duluth & Superior Bridge
Soc., 171 Wis. 283, 177 N.W. 332 (1920); First National Bank of Milwaukee
v. Town of Catawba, 183 Wis. 220, 147 N.W. 1013 (1924). See for reference
Schneider v. City of Menasha, 118 Wis. 298, 95 N.W. 94 (1903).
TI "A municipality is merely a department of the state and the state may with-
hold, grant, or withdraw powers or privileges as it sees fit. However great
or small its sphere of activity it remains the creature of the state exercising
and holding its powers and privileges subject to the sovereign will." Trenton
v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182, 43 Sup. Ct. 534, 67 L.ed. 937 (1923).
12 See City of Milwaukee v. Gross, 21 Wis. 243 (1866).
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as a restriction upon the general welfare clause." To strengthen local
government control over municipal affairs the legislature passed an act
providing that a city might alter its charter at a charter convention.14
This was a short-lived advance for the courts held that "legislative
delegation of authority to make a city charter or any part of it-
a power other than to adopt a legislative creation-would be a dele-
gation of legislative power and void."' 5
Cities of the first class' were granted additional "possible power
and leeway of action" by the home rule clause which in substance
provided that specific grants of power should not be construed as
restrictions upon the general welfare clause, and urged "liberal con-
struction" of powers granted to such cities.' The Wisconsin Supreme
Court commented that "* * * this legislation was intended to broaden
the power of cities of the first class."'1 and in a subsequent decision
restated the right of such cities, in absence of any restriction by the
state, to exercise powers incidental to general powers granted by state
authority.19 This was the state of the law until the passage of the
home rule amendment to the Wisconsin constitution.
Statewide agitation for recognition of local autonomy over matters
of municipal or local concern persisted, and in 1924 the voters by
referendum ratified an amendment to the Wisconsin constitution pro-
viding that "cities and villages organized pursuant to state law" were
to have the power to "determine their local affairs and government,
subject only to this constitution and to such enactments of statewide
concern as shall with uniformity affect every city or every village. 20
Home rule advocates felt that, despite problems earlier suggested,2
they had, to quote the language of another court, secured for munici-
"3 Chain Belt Co. v. City of Milwaukee, 151 Wis. 188, 193, 138 N.W. 621 (1912).
'
4
"Every city in addition to powers now possessed is hereby given authority
to alter or amend its charter, or to adopt a new charter by convention, in the
manner provided in this act, and for that purpose is hereby granted and
declared to have all powers in relation to the form of its government and
to conduct its municipal affairs not in contravention of or withheld by the
constitution or laws operating generally throughout the state." Wis. Laws
(1911) c. 476.
'5 State ex rel. Mueller v. Thompson, 149 Wis. 488, 138 N.W. 628 (1912).
This classification included then and includes now only Wisconsin's largest
city, i.e., Milwaukee.
1 Wis. Laws (1913) c. 678.
"s Milwaukee v. Filer & Stowell Co., 161 Wis. 426, 154 N.W. 625 (1915).
'1 City of Milwaukee v. Raulf, 164 Wis. 172, 159 N.W. 819 (1916).
20 Wis. CONST. art. xi § 3.
22 Query "whether the grant of home rule includes power to regulate matters
pertaining to taxation, eminent domain, police, health, education, streets, the
ownership of public utilities, etc." and suggestion that " * * * if the plan
were adopted of accompanying the general grant of self-government power
with a specific enumeration of powers within what might be called the twi-
light zone, it would be a matter of no great difficulty." See McBAiN, THE
LAW AND THE PRACTICE OF MUNICIPAL HoME RULE.
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pal corporations, "enjoyment of a large measure of organic inde-
pendence," and freedom from "officious legislation which seeks to
interfere with the private or proprietary functions" of local agencies.22
After some time had elapsed it became apparent that the task of dis-
tinguishing local affairs from state affairs, and matters of municipal
concern from matters of statewide concern might not yet be over.
Some suggested that the words used in the constitutional amendment
suggested inquiry rather than answered it. Although the court stated
that "the recognized purpose of this amendment was to confer upon
cities and villages a measure of self-government not heretofore pos-
sessed," 23 it also felt inclined to prophesy that "the probable hopes of
the ardent advocates of the home rule idea-to see the municipality
divorced from the legislature and a separate sovereign within the
sovereign state-are destined to a rude shock."
Some of the difficulties involved in precisely defining the term
"matters of statewide concern" are apparent. Any standard suggested
is more likely to prove subjective in character than objective. What
may appeal to one person or one court as purely local in character
may suggest itself to another as a matter of statewide concern. What
is quite local in character today may not be so tomorrow. In the "horse-
and-buggy" days of an earlier era it is quite conceivable that mainte-
nance of village streets could be placed in the category of local affairs.
Today when trucks and busses drive from city to city, village to
village is it still so? Before the advent of the automobile, traffic regu-
lations were of concern only to inhabitants of the particular communi-
ties involved thereby. Have they not become a matter of state and
nationwide importance today? At least one court has concluded that
the term "municipal affairs" is not a fixed quantity but fluctuates with
every change in the conditions upon which it operates. 5 Other prob-
lems suggest themselves. Treating of sewage and waste material may
be argued to be a matter of individual concern to the community
involved, but will the communities downstream so regard it? Smoke
inspection would seem to be a concededly urban problem in which
rural sectors of the state would have no concern. But if it is shown
to have a direct effect upon the health of city residents, would the
state's interest in advancement of the health of its citizenry transplant
it into the matters of statewide concern? If a local affair is one con-
cerning problems which arise through the concentration of popula-
tion in a given urban community, would not police administration be
local. But our court has held otherwise, and there is a definite state-
22 Hersey v. Neilson, 47 Mont. 132, 131 Pac. 30 (1913).
23 State ex rel. Sleeman v. Baxter, 195 Wis. 437, 219 N.W. 858 (1928).
- State ex rel. Ekern v. City of Milwaukee, 190 Wis. 633, 209 N.W. 860 (1926).2 5Helmer v. Superior Court, 48 Cal. App. 140, 191 Pac. 1001 (1920).
1937]
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wide concern in maintaining law and order and preventing crime. Our
court has held that although cities are not of dual nature,2 6 they do
have two kinds of functions. But if the standard is to be that pro-
prietary functions are presumed to be local in character and govern-
mental functions statewide, are we not by this test back to the demon-
strated difficulties involved in accurately separating municipal func-
tions? With the changing nature of governmental problems, with the
difficulty of determining state and local, private and governmental
functions, admitting that state and local government functions neces-
sarily overlap,27 we are almost compelled to accept a piecemeal devel-
opment of the law of home rule,28 and must content ourselves with
considering each case as it arises applying those principles which prece-
dent and logic approve.
2 9
One of the first cases in which the Wisconsin Supreme Court
addressed itself to defining the term "matters of statewide concern"
resulted from the refusal of municipal officials to concede the validity
of legislation raising the limit of taxation for school purposes, claiming
that the repair of school buildings is a local affair and that said law
conflicted with the rights of the city under the home rule amend-
ment. The court held the matter of education is one of statewide con-
cern by virtue of constitutional provisions, 0 and stated, "School build-
ings are an essential agency in the state's educational scheme. It fol-
lows that the so-called home rule amendment imposes no limitation
upon the power of the legislature to deal with the subject of education,
and this applies to every agency created or provided and to every
policy adopted by the legislature having for its object the promotion
of the cause of education throughout the state."'3 Thus the field of
education in its entirety is clearly subject to legislative control and not
within the purview of the home rule amendment.
Some months later there arose the question of whether regulations
concerning the heights of buildings fell into the field of local affairs or
were to be considered to be "matters of statewide concern." The court
held " * * * the height of buildings in cities is of statewide concern
under the rule heretofore recognized that health and safety regulations
26 City of Racine v. Levitan, 196 Wis. 604, 220 N.W. 398 (1928).
27 Van Gilder v. City of Madison, (Wis. 1936) 267 N.W. 25, 268 N.W. 108.
2
8 "The developments which have been made in the law of municipal home rule
have been more or less piecemeal during past years." Dawley, Special Legis-
lation and Municipal Home Rule (1932) 16 MINx. L. REv. 659.
29Carlberg v. Metcalf, 120 Neb. 481, 234 N.W. 87 (1930).
30 "The legislature shall provide by law for the establishment of district schools
which shall be as nearly uniform as practicable, and such schools shall be
free and without charge for tuition to all children between the ages of four
and twenty years, and no sectarian instruction shall be allowed therein." Wis-
CONST. art. x, § 3.
- State ex rel. Harbach v. Mayor, etc. of Milwaukee, 189 Wis. 84, 206 N.W.
210 (1925).
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are not merely for occupants and visitors of particular buildings but
for the people of the community and for the community at large
s2
* * * yet nevertheless the height of buildings in particular communities
is a problem which much more intimately and directly concerns the
inhabitants of that community than the casual visitor or other parts
of the state, it is a 'local affair'."3 3 This case introduces a new element
into the situation; the phrase "much more" indicates that in this juris-
diction there will be a balancing of concerns, and that matters of some
concern to the state will be considered "local affairs" if they more
directly and intimately concern the particular community involved.
Whether this much clarifies the situation is a question upon which
reasonable minds might differ.
The important question of whether police administration is a "mat-
ter of statewide concern" subject to legislative control or whether it
is a local affair reserved to the municipality under the home rule
amendment was presented to the supreme court in the case of Van
Gilder v. City of Madison.3 This was an action for recovery of salary
due the administratrix of a deceased Madison policeman, The plaintiff
contended that the local charter ordinance was invalid. By that ordi-
nance the city of Madison had chosen to reject the statewide statute
covering policemen's salaries and the local common council had pur-
ported to reduce policemen's salaries by ordinance. The court, pausing
to remark that terms "matter of statewide concern" as used in the
constitution "are practically indefinable" held that the charter ordi-
nance in question was invalid and held the matter of fire and police
protection to be a "matter of statewide concern" for the following
reasons (summarized): (1) The legislature exercises a sovereign
power of the people limited only by constitutions; (2) the preserva-
tion of order, the protection of life and property, and the suppression
of crime are primary functions of all civilized states; (3) in respect
to performing these functions municipalities are merely agencies of the
state; (4) the legislature has the power to rearrange the laws by
which these duties are discharged; (5) delegation of duty in these
regards to municipalities does not alter the situation; (6) the length of
time of delegation of these duties does not affect a state's right to con-
trol over these functions. Thus police administration in this state, as
in other jurisdictions,.3 has been held to be a matter of statewide
32 Citing Building Height Cases, 181 Wis. 519, 195 N.W. 544 (1923); State
ex rel. Carter v. Harper, 182 Wis. 148, 196 N.W. 451 (1923).
33 State ex rel. Ekern v. Milwaukee, 190 Wis. 633, 209 N.W. 860 (1926).
- (Wis. 1936) 267 N.W. 25, 268 N.W. 108.
35"Nor can such cities say to the state: You may man and control the police
force if you desire, but, if so, we will starve your system to death. We hold
the purse strings. These municipal corporations are subject to the sovereign
power of the state, and whilst they do in a sense hold the purse strings they
1937]
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interest, subject to legislative rearrangement. An important contribu-
tion to the law of home rule contained in the Van Gilder case is the
emphasis placed in the decision upon the fact that the legislature had
declared the provisions of the statute involved to be "an enactment of
statewide concern."3 6 The court states that the determination of what
is a "matter of statewide concern" would seem to be for the legisla-.
ture "for the reason that such a determination must involve large
considerations of public policy." This is in accord with the general
rule that matters of public policy are for the legislature, 7 and means
that subject to limitations of the constitution, determinations by the
legislature, though not absolutely controlling, are "entitled to great
weight." This holding definitely moves the home rule advocates back
into the legislative arena which they originally sought to avoid. It
shifts the responsibility for definition of terms back to the state
legislature.
Prevention and suppression of fires are definitely items of state-
wide concern under the reasoning and holding in the Van Gilder case.
In other jurisdictions, cases are not in accord as to whether statutes
relating to municipal fire departments are void as violating rights of
self-government under home rule. Some decisions hold that fire fight-
ing is a governmental or public function,38 while others hold that it is
a proprietary or corporate function and therefore local.3 9 In a recent
case, the Wisconsin Supreme Court has determined that the state laws
providing for fire and police commissions are enactments of statewide
concern, and has summarily disposed of the claim that the manner in
do so by consent of the state. Without the authority of the sovereign they
would not have a purse much less the strings of one. The power which gave
them the purse can limit the use of it. The power which put upon that purse
the strings can loosen the strings." State ex rel. Reynolds v. Jost, 262 Mo. 51,
175 S.W. 591 (1915) ; " * * * protection of life and property and preservation
of the public peace and order is a government duty which devolves upon the
state not the municipality." Hawes v. Mason, 153 Mo. 23, 54 S.W. 524 (1899) ;
but see Branch v. Albee, 71 Or. 188, 142 Pac. 598 (1914), stating, "As a police-
man is appointed by the city and his salary is paid by the city, and most of
his duties are municipal, he is in proper sense, a city officer although he is
also a peace officer and may make arrests under state law."
36 Wis. Laws (1935) c. 193.
7 Jessner v. State, 202 Wis. 184, 231 N.W. 634 (1930); Julien v. Model B. L.
& I. Ass'n., 116 Wis. 79, 92 N.W. 561 (1902); Borgnis v. Falk, 147 Wis. 327,
133 N.W. 209 (1911).
38 Operation of a fire department "is a governmental function not a municipal
one." Smidly v. Memphis, 140 Tenn. 97, 203 S.W. 512 (1918) ; "members of
a fire department are public or state officers." State ex rel. Haberlan v. Love,
89 Neb. 149, 131 N.W. 196 (1911).
3 "The duty of that department is confined to suppression of fires arising
within the municipal limits. Those living outside the municipality are not
affected by the performance of this duty unless they visit the municipality or
have property within its limits. The possibility of that occurrence does not
make the department a state agency." Davidson v. Hine, 151 Mich. 294, 68
S.W. 477 (1908).
[Vol. 21
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which fire and police officials are chosen is a local affair. 0 Whatever
distinctions between these two branches of public service may prevail.
elsewhere, in Wisconsin both fire and police departments are subject
to legislative control.
One other case remains to be considered. It is the New York
decision, which the Wisconsin court called "very illuminating and one
of the most authoritative discussions" on the subject. In this case a
multiple dwelling law was held to be legislation of statewide concern
because it affected the health of the community, which to quote the
majority opinion "has more to do with the general prosperity and wel-
fare of a state than its wealth or learning or culture."4' In a con-
curring opinion, Chief Judge Cardozo comments that "The Multiple
Dwelling Act seeks to bring about conditions whereby healthy children
shall be borne and healthy men and women reared, in the dwellings
of the great metropolis. To have such men and women is not a city
concern merely." He inquires, "If the moral and physical fiber of man-
hood and womanhood is not a state concern, the question is what is ?,,42
In a spirited dissent, Judge O'Brien complains that, judged by this
standard, "There is scarcely an act of local government that cannot
be tortured into one of sovereignty."43 If the reasoning of the majority
opinion in this New York case is followed in Wisconsin decisions, it is
reasonable to assume that the local court's statement that their inter-
pretation "leaves a rather narrow field in which home rule can operate
freed from legislative restriction"44 will be, if anything, an under-
statement.
To summarize the present state of the law in regard to home rule,
one can state that, in dealing with matters affecting education, fire-
fighting, police administration, promotion of health, and other phases
of government activity determined to be of "statewide concern," the
legislature deals with them free from any restriction contained in the
-o Logan v. Two Rivers, (Wis. 1936) 267 N.W. 36.
41 Adler v. Deegan, 251 N.Y. 467, 167 N.E. 705 (1929).
42"There may be difficulty, at times, in allocating interests to the state or
municipality, and in marking the respective limits when they seem to come
together. * * * A zone exists, however, where state and city concerns over-
lap and intermingle. * * * although they may be a concern of the city they
are subject nonetheless to regulation through the usual forms of regulation
if they are concerns of the state also." Cardozo, C. J., concurring opinion,
Adler v. Deegan, supra, p. 484.
43 "Few statutes could be proved to be exclusively local in their indirect influ-
ences. A law fixing the site of a garbage incinerator on a certain street in
Buffalo could by an elastic interpretation be shown to have some remote effect
on health of travelers from Duluth to Syracuse. * * * Non-residents might
stumble and fall in an unlighted hallway of a multiple dwelling. Many are
known to have done the same on a defective sidewalk. * * * Its (Multiple
Dwelling Law) relation to the state as a whole is so negligible as to be almost
entirely remote." O'Brien, J., dissenting opinion, Adler v. Deegan, supra, p. 505.
44Van Gilder v. City of Madison, supra, note 34.
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home rule amendment. The power to classifn cities in this regard
remains unimpaired. When the legislature deals with local affairs of
a city, such as establishing building height restrictions, if its act is not
to be subordinated to a charter ordinance, the act must be one which
applies with uniformity to every city. If in dealing with local affairs,
the legislature classifies cities, that act is subordinate to a charter ordi-
nance relating to the same matter.4 Whatever new developments the
future may bring, it is apparent that the commentator who wrote "the
long movement in Wisconsin for municipal home rule ended with the
adoption of the constitutional amendment"" was somewhat mistaken,
although he very correctly prophesied that "The reform was advocated
generally by political scientists, but now, with the reform adopted,
the remaining problems are for the legal profession."
45 Summarized from Van Gilder v. City of Madison, supra, note 34.
Note (1926) 3 Wis. L. REv. 423.
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